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"A purpose, an intention, or design strikes everywhere the most
careless, the most stupid thinker; and no man can be so hardened
in absurd systems, as at all times to reject it."
Philo, Dialogues

ii

PREFACE
The purpose of this thesis is to explain how David Hume
failed to establish in Part II of the Dialogues Concerning
Natural Religion that the design argument, as presented by
Cleanthes, is not a sound analogical argument.

The scope of

this thesis does not embrace a validation of the design argument.

What we are concerned with is whether Hume is able to invalidate
the argument in Part I I of the Dialogues via its analogical form.
It is Hume's contention, expressed in Part II of the
Dialogues, that the design argument, as presented by one of the
leading characters, Cleanthes, is not a sound analogical argument.
Hume uses Clean.thee to state and defend the design argument while
he employs Philo to express his own philosophical views.
Cleanthes' defense of the argument from design is based on the
logical mode of analogical reasoning.

Philo thinks that he can

refute the design argument as advocated by Clean.thee, and he
attempts to do just that by attacking the analogical form of

t~e

argument.
In Chapter II we will examine the argument from design, as
presented in Part II of the Dialogues by Cleanthes, in light of
analogical reasoning.

This 'will enable us to determine what the

analogical form of the design argument is, and the logical
criteria that could be employed for evaluating the argument.
Chapter III we will present Hume's refutation of the design
iii

In

argument which is based on the contention that the logic of
analogy employed in the design argument is faulty.

Chapter IV

will comprise a critical analysis o:f Hume's attempt at refuting
the design argument as presented by Cleanthes, in light of the
criteria presented in Chapter II for evaluating analogical
arguments.

Our analysis will reveal that Hume's objections to

the analogical mode of argumentation in the design argument are
not sufficient to support his evaluation of the argument from
design as not being a sound analogical argument.
To my knowledge, after a thorough investigation of the
subject comprising this thesis, I have only found one philosophical source that resembles this thesis.
the chapter entitled

11

Alvin Plantinga, in

The ·Teleological Argument," from his book

God and Other Minds, maintains that Hume's philosophical
criticisms of the formal logical structure of the design argument are not conclusive enough to dismiss it as having no
"logical force."
This thesis can be shown to have both similarities and
differences to A. Plantinga's.

The similarities consist of

refuting Hume's conclusion from his critique of the design
argument in Part II of the Dialogues, and employing the technique
of logical analysis in our refutation.

The dissimilarities are

manifested in the nature of our refutation.

Unlike Plantinga

who attempts to establish that the inference from the design

'

argument, as presented by Cleanthes in Part II of the Dialogues
has some "logical force," I am not interested in validating the
degree of probability for the inference.
iv

The other dissimilarity

is a matter of a formal logical analysis of the analogical mode
of the design argument as presented and criticized by David Hume.
At this time I would like to thank my advisory committee,
Professor Edward Maziarz and Dr. James Godar, for the unselfish
use of their time and knowledge.

Also, my wife, Sandy, for

her continuously increasing encouragement and good humor in
typing and proofreading this manuscript.
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C1I.AP1'ER I
BRIZF HISTORY 01'' THE DESIGU ARGtn•llil\f'.i:

The design argument has always been the most popular of
theistic arguments, tending to evoke opontaneous assent in simple
and sophisticated alike.
orderly system.

Man perceives the universe as an

Events have been recurring in regular sequences.

Tho observation of

a...~

orderly pattern in one region of existence

is found to be nicely adjusted to that of another, and both to
conform to an over-all design.

.All

annhilation of this order

would make scientific knowledge impossible and human life even
more precarious than it is.

In familiar objects near at hand,

particles of matter too small to be seen are said to be moving
in orbits similar to those traced out by remote planets.

It is

said that if even one particle of matter were destroyed, the
entire universe would be annihilated, so delicate are the
adjustments of this infinitely complex universe.
Such considerations have lead naturally to the idea of a
designer who must be credited with having planned the cosmos.
As early as the fifth century

B.c.,

Anaxagoras attributed the

working of the universe to a Mind or Intelligence.1

In the

fourth century B.C. Plato alpo sought to show that the order and
1see Joseph Owens, A History of Western Philosophy,
PP• 122-24.

1

2

harmony exhibited in the world sprang from the action of mind.
His argument entails the notion that all the activity and change
in the world originated from a supreme mind which moves itself
and creates subordinate souls or gods, the heavenly bodies.
The outerrr:ost sphere of the universe is set in motion by the
direct action of the changeless, transcendent God.2
kristotle, in the same era, propounded a more emphatic
teleological or purposive view of nature in which the members
of the hierarch,y of natural classes i.n the universe seek to
realize their perfections according to their sta-t;ions.
Aristotle's views presuppose a rational design, a universal
aspiration to f'ulfillment, and in one passage he describes God
as the perfect being whom all things desire.3
.rhe theological perspectives of Greek views of nature

1

passed into the later view of medieval science and were readily
translated into Christian thought.4

Dt. Thomas Aquinas, during

the thirteenth century, offered a typical statement of what
came to be called the argument from design.

The central thrust

of St. Thomas' argument is that things in nature regularly act
in certain ways in order to accomplish some useful purpose:
they act for the best, both with respect to their own welfare
and to that of other beings who depend upon them.

But in most

instances, the thing concerned is obviously not aware of the
3;Javid Hoss, Aristotle, PP• 179-86.
4Robert H. Hurlbutt III, :rume, Kewton, and the Design
Argument, PP• 116-26.

3
purpose for which it acts:
intelligently at all.

it is not acting intentionally or

"Therefore some intelligent being exists

by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this
being we call God. 11 5

Like st. J:homas' other "proofstt of God's existence, the
argument from design reappeared in new versions in the writings
o~

the early modern philosophers.

A classic statement of the

modern argument from design is to be found in Part II of
David Hume's Dia1ogues Concerning Natural Religion.

The form

of the argument from design, as presented in the Dialogues
persisted into the nineteenth century in the writings of Paley
and so many others, and survives in popular and semi-popular
forms to the present,day.6
The philosophical perspective of nature adopted after
the rise of science in the seventeenth century, was reflected
in the logic of the modern

d~sig.n

argument.

The new philosophy

of nature abandoned belief in the intrinsic teleology of
physical objects.
Thus the modern argument from design is not a teleological
argument of the Aristotelian type. That is, it does not
consist in the thesis that the natural order, with which man
is integrally bound up, fulfills an end of absolute and
intrinsic worth.7
5Thomas Aquinas, Sum.ma Thcologica, Pt. I, Question II,
art. 3, Great Books of the Western World, trans. by Fathers of
the English Dominican Province, revised by Daniel J. Sullivan,

XIX, 13.
The
No.

'

from Design," Philosophy:
Philoson , XLIII,

7navid Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed.,
with an introduction, by Korman Kemp Smith, p. 28.

4

"It is an essentially anthropormorphic type of argument,"
Horman Kemp Smith asserts, "resting upon an alleged analogy
between natural existences and the artificial products of human
contrivance. 11 8

It was maintained by the users of this argument

that we could gain a sufficient basis for the existence and
conception of God as an ordering intelligence in our knowledge
of the self and of its relation to the products which it
consciously designs.9
David Hume's treatment of the design argument in the
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is widely hailed as a
r:iasterpiece of philosophical criticism.

"Hume's destructive

criticiDm of the argument," says Norman Komp Smith, in his
introduction to Hume's Dialogues, "was final and complete."10
11

.And

there is much to be said for the estimate," Alvin Plantinga

states in his book, God and Other Minds, :for "Hume's discussion
is matchless for clarity, imagination, and grace."11
10Ibid., P• 30.

-

11Alvin Pla.ntinga, God and Other Minds, p. 97.

CHAPTER II
CLEANTHES' ARGUMENT
The Logic of the Design Argument
Certain important questions are raised by David Hume at
the very beginning of his examination of natural theology in
the Dia1ogues.1
of theology?

What can be demonstrable by reason in matters

Are the methods of reasoning in theology different

from those of common life and of science?

Is there a

possibility of utilizing scientific knowledge about nature,
and the methods of observation, as basis for interring the
existence and attributes of God?

Cleanthes, in direct response

argues that theological reasoning does not differ in method
and assurance from scientific and practical reasoning; and in
support of these contentions, he presents the following argument
in Part II of the Dialogues:
Look round the world: Contemplate the whole and every part
of it: You will find it to be nothing but one great machine,
subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which
again admit of subdivisions, to a degree beyond what human
senses and facilities can trace and explain. All these
various 1D4chines, and even their most minute parts, are
adjusted to each other with an accuracy, which ravishes
into admiration all men, who have ever contemplated them.
The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all
nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the
productions of human contrivance; of human design, thought,
wisdom, and intelligenceJ Since therefore the effects
resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules
of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the
Author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man;
though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned
to the grandeur of the work, which he has executed. By
1Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, pp. 137-38.
5

6
this argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do
we prove at once the existence ~f a Diety, and his similarity
to human mind and intelligence.
The quintessence of the stated argument from design is
the contention that design or an adaption of means to end can
be explained only in terms of an intelligent being or designer.
In order for something to be a machine or manufactured item, so
the argument reads, it must have a composition of parts, each
performing a special function which contributes to the over-all
purpose {telos) of the thing in question.

There is another

characteristic mentioned above which is equally necessary if a
thing is to be called a machine:

the means-end relationship

(or teleological order) typifies a product of design, thought,
wisdom, and intelligence.

Since both human artifacts and the

universe are characterized by this property their causes must
be intelligent as well.
The design argument as stated may be put schematically as
follows:
1.

The productions of human contrivance are the products of

intelligent design.
2.

The universe resembles the productions of human contrivance.

3.

Therefore probably the universe is a product of intelligent

design.

4.

Therefore probably the author of the universe is an

intelligent being.

'

7
Analogical Reasoning
In examining the above argument from design it is evident
that the key factor in the argument is its form--the analogical
form that it employs.

Analogical arguments are a species of

an inductive argument which involve inferences to unotservable
portions of the past or present or to the future based on past
experience of similar events.

Arguments from analogy have

the following general form:
1.

Analogue A tested or observed for properties b, c, and d

have these properties.
2.

.Analogue A1 is similar to Analogue A in having properties

b and c.

3.

Therefore probably Analogue A1 as yet untested or observed

for property d has this property.
Analogical reasoning is employed in most of our everyday
inferences and is also widely used in scientific inferences.
Thus we infer that the next course we take from a particular
instructor will be interesting from the fact that both of
two courses taken from the instructor were interesting.

Based

on the evidence that we got good wear from shoes previously
purchased from a particular store we infer that the next pair
of shoes we purchase from the same store will wear well.
Professor Swinburne describes the logical form common
in scientific inferences, which essentially entails an
analogical structure.
A's are caused by B's. A*s are similar to As. Therefore-given that there is no more satisfactory explanation of
the existence of A*s--they are produced by B*s similar to
Ba. B*'s are postulated to be similar in all respects to

8

B's except insofar as shown otherwise, viz. except insofar
as the dissimilarities between A's and A*'s force us to
postulate a difference ••••
He furnishes the following scientific example to illustrate the
above.
Certain pressures (A's) on the walls of containers are
produced by billiard balls (B's) with certain motions.
Similar pressures (A*'s) are produced on the walls of
containers which contain not billiard balls but gases.
Therefore, since we have no better explanation of the
existence of the pressures, gases consist of particles
(B*'s) similar to bi~liard balls except in certain
respects--e.g. size.
Swinburne is aware that similar arguments used by
scientists that have argued for the existence of many
unobservables become weaker " ••• insofar as the properties which
we are forced to attribute to the B*'s because of the differences
between the A's and the A*'s become different from those of the

B's."4 An example of this type is the nineteenth century
physicists postulating the existence of an elastic solid, aether,
to account for the propagation of light.

The outcome was that

the light being propagated resulted in such differences that
the physicists had to affirm that if there was an aether it
possessed many peculiar properties not possessed by normal
liquids or solids.

Hence their conclusion was that the

probability of the inferred existence of aether was very weak.5
All of the evidence compiled in support of analogical
inferences cannot guarantee phat the arguments are certain, or
3swinburne, "The Argument from Design," 205.
5rb1d.

4.rbid.

9

demonstrably valid.

None of their conclusions follow with

"logical necessity" from their premises.

It is even logically

possible that one fire may burn but not another.

At the same

time it must be remembered that no argument by analogy is
intended to be mathematically certain.

Analogical arguments

are not to be classified as either "valid" or "invalid."
Probability is all that is claimed for them.
Cleanthes' Argument Viewed in Light
of Analogical Reasoning
Although no argument by analogy is ever "valid," in the
sense of having its conclusion follow from its premises with
logical necessity, some are more cogent than others.

Analogical

arguments may be appraised as establishing their conclusions
as more or less probable.

At this time we shall outline the

criteria which are applied to arguments of this type.

We will

then discuss the criteria in light of the analogical reasoning
in the stated argument from design, in order to determine what
logical criteria might be used for evaluating the probability
of the argument.

(This will help us, as we shall see in

Chapter IV, to evaluate Hume's objections to the analogical
form of the design argument as stated by Cleanthes.)
The criteria for evaluating analogical arguments consist
essentially of three elements:

(1)

the number of similar

properties that have been obperved between objects or analogues,
(2)

the number of similar instances in which the properties

of analogues have been observed, and (3) the relevant ways in
which the properties of analogues are said to support the
conclusion of analogical arguments.

10
The analogues of "sheets" and "towels" are employed below
to illustrate how the probability of analogical inferences can
be affected by the number of similarities that the properties
of analogues have in common.
The fact that sheets and towels are alike in being
cotton, white, and flat provides a good basis for
arguing that they will be alike in further characteristics of being well-laundered. If we could add more
characteristics that we know they have in common such
as size and weight of material, this would add to the
worth of the argument ••••
If you discover a sufficient degree of diff erenoes between the
properties of "well-laundered" items the probability of the argument would decrease.
If the towels have fancy lacework and the sheets do not,
or if the sheets were silk and the towels cotto~, then
the probability of the argument would deorease.6
Another example employing the analogues of "shoes" illustrates
the importance of determining the strength of analogical arguments
by sufficient number of similar characteristics that the properties of the analogues have in common,
That a new pair of shoes was purchased at the same store
as an old pair that gave good wear is certainly a premise
from which it follows that the new shoes will probably
give good wear also. But the same conclusion follows
with greater probability if the premises assert not only
that the shoes were purchased from the same store, but
they were manufactured by the same company, that they
sold for the same price, that they are the same style,
and that I plan to wear them in the same circumstances
and activities.?

'
The following is an illustration
that depicts two instances
of analogical inferences admitting of different degrees of
6itobert Sha:nvy, Logic an Outline, p. 110.
?Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic, p. 344.

11

probability based on the number of observable instances in which
the properties of analogues or events have been said to be
observed.
If I advise you not to send your shirts to such and such
a laundry because I sent one there once and it came back
ruined, you might caution me against "jumping to conclusions," and urge that they ought to perhaps be given
another chance. On the other hand, if I give you the
same advice and justify it by recounting four different
occasions on which unsatisfactory work was done by them
on my clothing and report further that our mutual friends
Jones and Smith have also patronized them repeatedly with
unhappy results, these premises serve to establish the
conclusion with a great deal higher probability than dSd
the first argument which cited only a single instance.
It should be noted that the differences between the degrees of
certitude is not a simple numerical ratio between the number of
instances and the probability of the conclusion.

Numerical ratios

are employed in the frequency theory of probability and the calculation of probabilities but not with the probability associated
with analogical arguments.

An examination of the above analogical arguments reveals
that the number of differences or similarities between the
properties of the analogues together with the number of instances
in which these properties had been observed had a bearing on the
probability of the analogical inferences.

The examples presented

thus far have all been fairly good examples, because the analogies
have all been relevant.

But it is commonly agreed on that it is

difficult to know in general, or even in some particular cases,
exactly which things are relevant and which are not.
As Kahane states, "Even the room in which a course is to be
8

.I.2!S·· pp. 343-44.

12
taught may be relevant to how interesting it will be.

(For

example, it would be relevant if the teacher in question disliked
large, poorly lit rooms, and the next course he teaches happens
to be in such a room.)•$

Professor Alvin Plantinga, in agreement,

asserts that:
For naturally enough the members of any class resemble
each other in some respect; the problem is to specify
how much and in what respect the members of the sample
class must resemble those of the reference class,
minus the sample class.10
The following illustration depicts how an analogical inference
supported on a single relevant analogy connected with a single
instance will be more cogent than one which depicts a dozen
irrelevant points of resemblance between its conclusion's instance
and over a number of instances enumerated in its premises:
Thus a doctor's inference is sound when he reasons that

Mr. Black will be helped by a specific drug on the
grounds that Mr. White was helped by it when a blood

test showed exactly the same type of germs in his system
that are now in Mr. Black's. But it would be fantastic
for him to draw the same conclusion from premises that
assert that Smith, Jones and Robinson were all helped
by it, and that they and Black all patronize the same
tailor, drive the same make and model car, have the same
number of children, had similar educations, and were all
born under the same sign of the zodiac.11
Although the difficulty is present it is still maintained
that in rractice we employ the criterion of relevancy in either
evaluating or formulating analogical arguments.

As Plantinga

states:
9Howard Kahane, Logic and Philosophy, PP• 269-?0.
lOPlantinga, God and Other Minds, P• 105.
11 copi, Introduction to Logic, P• 347.

13
Still, even if we cannot give the rules for detecting
relevant differences or for determining appropriate degrees of similarities we are able to do this in practice;
the fact is that we often recognize, as in the case of
some of the arguments mentioned, that the sample class
does not resemble the reference Qlass minus the sample
class in the relevant respects.12
How could we evaluate Cleanthes' argument from design, which
is an analogical argument?

We could begin by maintaining as Cle-

anthes does that the universe is similar to human contrivances in
that both exhibit a "curious adapting of means to ends," and that
there is a considerable number oi instances of design observed in
the world to support the probability of an intelligent designer
of the universe.

For example, Arthur I. Brown, a contemporary

writer, refers to the ozone in the atmosphere which filters out
enough of the burning ultra-violet rays of the sun to make life
as we know it possible on the earth's surface.

He states:

The Ozone gas layer is a mighty proof of the Creator's
forethought. Could anyone possibly, attribute the device
to a chance evolutionary process? A wall which prevents
death to every living thing, just the right thickness,
and exactly the correct defense, gives every evidence
of plan.13
Another contemporary writer, Richard Taylor, refers to the homeostasis or self-regulation of our bodies, which serves as a safeguard for maintaining the proper balance between internal and
external forces acting upon it, as an instance of design.
The homeostasis or self-regulation of our own bodies,
for instance, whereby vhe body manages to maintain the
12Plantinga, God and Other Minds, P• 105.
1 3Arthur I. Brown, Foot~rints of God, cited by John Hick,
Philosopb.y of Religion, p. 2 •

14
most unbelievable internal harmony and to adapt itself
to the most diverse and subtle forces acting upon it,
represents a wonder which human art cannot really14
duplicate and our science only dimly comprehends.
Taylor also suggests the same type of' teleological order in the
embryological development of' living things.
order and

seemi~

"The same type ot

goal-directed change is apparent in the embry-

ological development of living things. 111 5
Again Albert Einstein refers to "• •• the sublimity and marvelous order which reveals themselves both in nature and in the
world of' thought." 16 Even Philo, later in the Dialogues, concedes that the universe certainly seems initially to resemble
things we know to be designed; the impression that the universe
has been designed is hard to avoid: "A purpose, an intention, or
design strikes everywhere the most careless, the most stupid
thinker; and no man can be so hardened in absurd systems, as at
all times to reject it. 111 7 Kant thinks the analogy ot the known
parts of the universe to the products of design is sutticient to
support such argument and moreover better than any thing else at
hand.

"Jrut at any rate we must admit that, if' we are to specify

a cause at all, we cannot here proceed more securely than by analogy with those purposive productions of' which alone the cause and
mode of action are fully known to us. 018
14Richard Taylor, Metaphysics, p. 95.
(

l5Ibid.
16Albert Einstein, "A Scientist•s Cosmology," in Philosophy
in the Age of Crisis, ed. by Eleanor Kuykendall, P• 436.

-

l?Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, P• 214.
18 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, cited by Plantinga,
God and Other Minds, p. 106.

15
Mill thinks that the adaptations of means to ends in nature
afford a high degree of probability in favor of an intelligent
cause or designer for the ord.erful universe.

As he states:

Leaving this remarkable speculation to whatever fate
the progress of discovery may have in store for it, I
think it must be allowed that, in the present state
of our knowledge, the adaptations in Nature afford a
large balance of probability in favour of creation by
intelligence.19
The difficult problem that we would have in evaluating the
argument from design would be to determine whether the property
of design was a relevant characteristic or property to support
the inference in the argument with any degree of probability at
all.

In order to assess this problem we might begin by recalling

the purpose of the argument from design.

The telos of the

design or teleological argument is to establish the synergistic
relation between design and designer (teleos and techne) in
both human contrivances and the universe.

As W. P. Alston

rightly points out: "This is the heart of the teleological argument--the claim that adaptation can be explained only in terms
of a designer." 20
In conjunction with the above, John Stuart Mill maintained
the design or purpose in the universe was a relevant characteristic in the design argument because there is some connection
through causation between design in nature and its causal origin.
l9John Stuart Mill, "The Argument from Design," in Philosopb_z
in the Age of Crisis, ed. by Kuykendall, p. 488.
20 william P. Alston, "Teleological Argument for the Existence
of God," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, VIII, 85.

16
As he states, "• •• the argument is greatly strengthened by
the properly inductive considerations which established that
there is some connection through causation between the origin
of the arrangements of nature and the ends they fulfill." 21
Of course, it might be argued that the universe does not
resemble some man made products.

"True enough, the universe
does not greatly resemble a spring loom or a golf club. 1122 It
may even be that the universe resembles an animal or a plant
in some respects more than the products of human contrivance,
as Hume suggests in his second half of the critique of the
design argument.

This, however, is not enough to disqualify

the design argument, since plants and animals themselves, as
well as some of their parts, exhibit the property of design:
the curious adaptation of means to ends.

As Plantinga states:

This, however, is not to the point, since plants and
animals themselves (as well as some of their parts)
have the reference property: they too, exhibit the
curious adaptation of means to ends. ]Jes for 1xampie1 are often cited as having this property.2'
What has to be kept in mind at this point, as R. G. Swinburne observes is that "All analogies break down somewhere,
otherwise they would not be analogies." 24 In saying that the
relation of analogue A to property B is analogous to a relation

ot analogue A1 to a postulated characteristic B1 , we do not
21 m11, "The Argument from Design," p. 488.
22Plantinga, God and other Minds, p. 106.
23Ibid.
24Swinburne, "The Argument from Design," p. 209.

l?
claim that A1 is in all respects like A, and Bl is in all respects
like B. The degree of similarities or differences between A and
A1 , and Band B1 is built into analogical arguments. For the
degree of support for analogical arguments, as was pointed out
above, is directly related to the similarities or differences
between the types of evidence available.
The final outcome of this objection concerning the relevancy of design as being a sufficient characteristic or property
to support the probability of the conclusion in the argument
from·design can be construed as Plantinga suggests as a query:
are the admitted differences between the universe and things
we know to be designed minus the similarity between the analogues, (which is established on the basis of the "curious adapting of means to ends" exhibited in both cases) sufficient to
support the inference in the argument with any strength at all? 2 5
Since the object of this work precludes the validating of the
argument from design, we have only to inquire whether Hume has
furnished the necessary answer to this question.
Since it is Hume's evaluation of the design argument that
is under consideration we would do well to consider exactly what
Hume's job entailed!
To begin with, Cleanthes postulated the similarity between
the universe and things we know to be designed on the basis of

'

the "curious adaptating of means to ends" exhibited in both
analogues.

What Hume could have done, since he challenged the

25Plantinga, God and Other Minds, p. 206.

18

validity of Cleanthes•s argument, was to account for the differences between the two analogues.
Next he might have observed the actual instances of design
said to be exhibited in the world as well as in artificial products of contrivance.

If he was able to point out only a limited

number of instances of design in the world he would have had
substantial support for his conclusion that the argument from
design is not a sound analogical argument.

This is evident

because the degree of support for analogical arguments is proportional to the number of similar instances said to have been
observed between the properties of analogues.
Although Hume might have pointed out the differences between
the universe and things we know to be designed, this by itself
would not have supported his evaluation.

He would still have had

to consider the characteristic which they have in common, i.e.,
the "curious adapting of means to ends."

If he did consider

this similarity he might have explained how the property of
design was not a relevant characteristic to support the conclusion in the design argument.

In order to accomplish this he would

have had to explain how the differences between the universe and
things we know to be designed override the force of the similarity between the analogues, via design, to vitiate the argument.

CHAPTER III
HUME'S ATTEMPT AT REFUTATION
The design argument, "• •• as honest and straightforward
as a Norman Rockwell painting," 1 as Plantinga describes it, was
placed precariously on Hume's drawing board tor evaluation.
The problem that challenged Hume with the design argument, Norman Kemp Smith asserts, is "• •• the question whether the argument from design, as an argument from analogy, can allow of
being formulated in a tenable manner. • • • If

"This indeed,'' Mr.

Smith continues, "is the thesis with which the Dialogues are
primarily concerned, and to which they give what amounts to a
definitely negative answer. 112
Hume sketched his critique of the design argument in two
discernible parts.

In the first part of his critique, which

appears in Part II of the Dialogues, Hume does not explicitly
address himself to the theistic nature of the intelligent designer of the universe.

The design argument as stated by Clean-

thes in Part II of the Dialogues and rebuked by Philo describes
the cause of the teleological order or adaptation of means to
ends in the universe as only a very intelligent being or
designer.

This is because the analogy in the argument is not

'

intended to support additional inferences.

As Mr. Smith states

1Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds, P• 95.
2 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, p. 56.
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in his introduction to the Dialogues: "Before this argument
could be taken as establishing the existence of the God of religion, it had ot course to be supplemented by other types of
argument.

These, however, are supplementary to the argument

trom design."3
It is only in the second halt of his critique ot the argument from design, which occupies the latter part of the Dialogues,
that Hume addresses himself to the additional inferences to the
theistic nature of the intelligent cause of the universe.

In so

doing he employs his reductio ad absurdum. arguments in order to
explain the following.

Even if we grant that the analogy

employed in the design argument as stated by Cleanthes is sound,
and that is .! posteriori, one can, by precisely the same methods
of analogy and from the same kind of evidence, deduce a number of
conclusions about the proposed cause ot the world that are
remarkably obnoxious to those who accept traditional religious
doctrines.

The world is disorderly as well as orderly, hence

implies a disorderly cause; the world is tull of evil as well
as beneficent purposive-relationships, and hence implies an evil
cause; machines and houses are otten made by many artisans,
hence the world has multiple causes--many gods.

In other words,

in the absurdum arguments Hume shows that analogical arguments
of precisely the same form

~nd

of equal validity demonstrate

conclusions radically at variance with those accepted by the
users of the design argument who want to argue the following:
3Ibid., P• 29.

-
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(1) the designer or creator of the universe is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good; and (2) the creator of the universe
is an eternal spirit, without body, and in no way dependent upon
physical objects.
As I have mentioned earlier the scope of this work embraces
only the first part of Hume's critique of the design argument.
With this in mind we shall proceed to examine Hume's critique of
the argument from design in Part II of the Dialogues.
Before beginning his evaluation of Cleanthes's argument,
Philo, Hume's mouthpiece, informs Cleanthes of his understanding
of Cleanthes' argument.
e!.Perience we find (according to Cleanthes) that • • •

~toapecompose
or form, they will never arrange themselves so as
a watch. Stone and mortar, and wood, without
W! Throw several pieces of steel together, without

an architect, never erect a house. But the ideas in a
human mind, we see, by an unknown, inexplicable oeconomy,
arrange themselves so as to form the plan of a watch or
house. • • • Experience, therefore, proves, that there
is an original principle of order in mind, not in matter.
From similar effects we infer similar causes. The
adjustment of means to end isalike in the universe, as
in a machine of human contrivance. The causes, therefore, must be resembling.4
Philo's critique of the design argument begins immediately

afterwards.

"Now it is clear," Robert Hurlbutt correctly points

out, "that the key factor in the design argument is its form-the analogical form of inference that it employs--and therefore
it is natural that it is the main part of Hume's attack."5

'

Philo contends that the design argument is not a sound
4

~'

~.,

p. 146.

5aobert H. Hurlbutt III, Hume, Newton, and the Design Argup. 150.
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analogical argument.

"The dissimilitude," Philo states, between

the design argument and a sound analogical argument, "is so
striking, that the utmost you can here pretend to is a guess, a
conjecture, a presumption concerning a similar cause; and how
that pretension [the inference drawn in the design argument to
an intelligent designer for the universe] will be received in
the world, I leave you to oonsider. 116
There are three central objections, which will be developed
in order, that Philo levels against the design argument in Part
II of the Dialogues in support of his eva+uation ot Cleanthes•
argument.
(1) The design attributed to the world as a whole cannot be
interred from particular oases of design found in the world,
hence it cannot be employed as an instance to establish the
similarity between the universe and things we know to be
designed.
(2) Since the world is one particular, not a member of a
species a great number of whose members have been observed,
it cannot be employed as an analogue or subject in the
analogical argument from design.

The world being a parti-

cular, is unique; it is on the surface not a member of the
class of machines.

(3) Since no one has eieen the origin of one world, let alone
"worlds" we do not have the requisite instances of similarity to support the conclusion to an intelligent being or
6Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, p. 144.
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designer of the universe.
The first objection that Philo levels against the design
argument is based on his contention that no whole can resemble
its parts or some set of its parts sufficiently to support an
analogical argument.

As he states:

But can a conclusion, with any property, be transferred
from parts to whole? Does not the great disproportion
bar all comparison and inference? From observing the
growth of an hair, can we learn anything concerning the
generation of a man? Would the manner of a leaf's blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree??
The above passage viewed in light of Philo's direct criticism of the design argument, can be understood as follows.

Philo

wants to argue that since the operation or adaptation of means to
end in the universe is represented as the design or teleological
order of the universe as a whole it cannot be logically employed
as an instance to establish the similarity between the universe
and things we know to be designed.

This is evident, Philo insists,

because we would be inf erring the design or purpose of the universe as a whole from particular cases of design found in nature,
and we cannot do this: "• •• the operation of one part of nature
upon another for the foundation of our judgement concerning the
origin of the whole ( • • • can never be admitted) • • • • 8
Philo follows this objection with one that does take into
consideration the nature

o~

the relevant whole.

When two species of objects have always been observed
to be conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, the
existence of one wherever I see the existence of the

........

7.............
Ibid., p. 14? •

8

~.,

P• 148.
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other: And this I call an argument from experience.
But how this argument can have place, where the objects,
as in the present case, are single, individual, without
parallel or specific resemblance, may be difficult to
explain. And will any man tell me with a serious countenance, that an orderly universe must arise from some
thought and art, like the human; because we have experience of it? To ascertain this reasoning, it were
requisite, that we had experience ot the origin of
worlds; and it is not sufficient, surely, that we have
seen ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance. 9
All cases, Philo is arguing in the above passage, in which we
analogically argue from effects to causes must refer to (a)
effects of exactly a similar nature, effects which can be shown
to belong to members of the same species; and (b) the causes
as well as the effects of the analogues must be experienced.
That a stone will fall, that fire will burn, that the
earth has solidity, we have observed a thousand and a
thousand times; and when any new instance ot this nature
is presented, we draw without hesitation the accustomed
inference.10
But, in the design argument of Cleanthes, which says that the
world is a machine, we do not have the requisite experience of
similarity.

The world is a particular; it does not belong to a

species; it is unique; it is on the surface not a member ot the
class of machines.

Further, in machines, houses, etc., the

cause ia observed, time after time, to be responsible tor the
effect.

But in the design argument this condition does not hold.

Since we have no such experience of the origin of worlds, "• ••
I(

will any man tell me with a serious countenance, that an orderly
universe must arise from some thought and art, like the hum.an;
because we have experience of it?rtll

9.!£!A., PP• 149-50.

10

~·

t

p. 144.

11

Ibid., PP•

149-50.
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Cleanthes, in the midst of the argument just referred to,
insists that if Philo's strictures are accepted, then Galileo's
argument concerning the earth's motion is invalid.

"• •• a

caviller might raise all the same objections to the Copernican
system, which you have urged against my reasonings.

Have you

other earths, might he say, which you have seen to move?
Have. • • •

Ph.ilo's response is quick:

Yesl • • • Is not the moon another earth, which we
see to turn round its centre? Is not Venus another earth,
where we observe the same phenomenon? Are not the revolutions of the sun also a confirmation, from analogy, of
the same theory? All the planets, are they not earths,
which revolve about the sun? Are not the satellites
moons, which move around Jupiter and Saturn, and along
with these primary planets, round the sun? These analogies and resemblances, with others which I have not mentioned, are the sole proofs of the Copernican system:
And to you it belongs to consider, whether you have any
analogies of the same kind to support your theory.13

Note that according to Philo's point on observing causes and
effects, Galileo's argument would offer a hypothesis, rather than
a proof--it is the "sole" proof, according to Philo.

But the

similarities observed between the earth and the moon, etc., are
full and complete.

Both are members of the species of planets,

and there is evidence enough to justify a high degree of probability in the hypothesis that the earth moves,

Cleanthes, Philo

observes, does not have such evidence at his disposal.

The

world is not experienced to be the effect of either a machine
or a work of art.

' of inference involve an argument
Both sorts

to a first cause, and therefore both are subject to Philo's
criticism that neither involves the observation of causes.
12

~•• p. 150.
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Nobody has seen the origin of worlds.
Can you pretend to show any such similarity between the
fabric of a house and the generation of a universe? Have
you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles
the first arrangement of the elements? Have worlds ever
been formed under your eye? And have you had leisure to
observe the whole progress of the phenomenon, from the
first appearance of order to its final consummation? If
you have, then cite your experience, and deliver your
theory.14
Now Philo, in the quotations abovet clearly proposed one
sort of test for analogical arguments--the standard of observation with respect to the relationship of causes and effects.
The hypothesis that the world is the product of intelligent
design, is caused by a designer-mechanic-purposer is verified
by observing that worlds are created by designers.
no worlds-in-creation have been observed.

But, we find,

Since this key aspect

of analogical (scientific) reasoning is missing--the experience
necessary to correct analogical inferences from effects to causes
--we can only proceed .! priori; and "For ought we can know .! priori, matter may contain the source of spring of order, origin-ally,
within itself • • • • "1 5 "This eventuality," R. H. Hurlbutt
observes, "came to pass, almost on the heels of Hume's suggestion,
in Darwin's theory of evolution." 16
In conclusion, Philo's critique of Cleanthes's argument
from design can be viewed in terms of the following three rejections.

He begins by (1) r&jecting the design or the adaptation

of means to ends, which is attributed to the universe as a whole,
14Ibid., P• 151.

16liurlbutt,

Hume, Newton, and the Design Argu?J!ent,
l5Ibid., P• 146.

p. 153.
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being an instance that can be employed to establish the similarity
between the universe and things we know to be design.

Next he

rejects (2) the use of the universe being used as an analogue or
subject in a sound analogical argument.

Finally he rejects (3)

the inference to the universe being a product of intelligent
design because of the lack of instances in which there has been
an observation of worlds being created.
Philo's reasons for the above three contentions rest on the
following arguments.

In regards to (1) Philo argues that no

whole can resemble its parts or some set of its parts sufficiently
to support an analogical argument.

Since the design which is

attributed to the world is designated in the design argument as
the design of the universe as a whole, it cannot be used to
establish the similarity between the universe and things we know
to be designed; this is evident because the inference is based on
particular cases of design found in nature and this would involve
an argument from parts to whole.

Philo's reason for (2) is based

on his assumption that all cases in which there is an analogical
inference from effects to causes they must refer to effects which
can be shown to be of exactly a similar nature; this can only be
established by showing how the effects belong to members of the
identical species.

Philo's contention in (3) rests on his conten-

tion that in order to

draw~n

analogical inference of a cause for

any effect it is necessary to have experienced the cause and

effect in conjunction.

Since no one has seen the intelligent

designer responsible for the design of the universe in the process
of designing or creating, Cleanthes cannot draw his inference to
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an intelligent designer who would be responsible for the design
of the universe.

Since the world is unique the user of the design

argument cannot maintain that the world is similar to or belongs
to the species of machines of human contrivances, thus it cannot
be employed as an analogue in the design argument.
In the next and final chapter we will learn that Hume's
(Philo's) critique of Cleanthes' argument was not adequate to
support his thesis.

This will be established by explaining how

Hume's three basic assumptions and arguments in support of the
same are neither conclusive nor accurate enough to evaluate the
argument from design as stated by Cleanthes, as not being a
sound analogical argument.

r

CHAPrER IV
HUME'S FAILURE AT REFUTATION

David Hume sat in the open-air theatre, disguised as a
critic by the name of Philo, listening to a monologue by a character named Cleanthes.

The content of the speech was similar to

what he had heard several times before.

It concerned the nature

or character of the world and its parts pointing most clearly
to the existence of some very intelligent being or "guiding hand,"
that is, to some purposeful being responsible tor the ordertul
universe.

A universe, according to

w.

B•. Yeats, in which man is

not afraid that anarchy will be loosed upon it.
They !!Z !.!!.! .!!!.! thins, Hume whispered to himself,
we find

!.! n2i

!. !!.!£!. srain g1_

~'

these .2.£ similar things .!!2£ !. chaos.
~

!g, sai nothins £.!.

!!:!! m:ysteri

.5?.!!£ profoundest science

trate.

~

!!.2!: .! gonglomeration g!

and har-We -find -an order -

~

learnins

~

complexit1 ££, things

~

~

only barely !g, pene-

After the monologue was completed Hume went home to write

his critique.

This chapter will critically analyze that critique,

and attempt to prove that it does not establish what it purports.
In order to facilitate this critical analysis of Hume's critique there will be a review
of each specific criterion that Hume
If
might have employed in order to support his evaluation of Cleanthes' argument from design in Part II of the Dialosues in conjunction with his objections to the stated argument.
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This in turn
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will be followed by a critical analysis to determine whether or
not Hume's objections are (1) conclusive enough to encompass
sufficient answers to the key questions for evaluating the design
argument, or (2) accurate enough by themselves to invalidate the
argument.
The first criterion that Hume might have employed in his
critique of Cleanthes• argument was to determine what the dissimilarities were between the universe and human contrivances.
Out of the three central cbjections to the logic of the design
argw:rient Hume's second objection seems to be related to the
above problem, if only in an indirect way.
He argues that the universe or world cannot be employed as
an analogue in the argument from design because there is no way
to establish the similarities, nor for the fact, the differences
between the properties of the world and human contrivances.
Hume's reference to this point was made in conjunction with
Ph.ilo's comparison of the analogical argument in support of the
Copernican system with that of the design argument.
As Philo stated: "Is not the moon another earth, which we
see to turn around its center? • • .Are not the revolutions of
the sun also a confirmation, from analogy, of the same theory?" 1
The reference to Galileo was specific:

"But Galileo, beginning

with the moon, proved its &;i.milarity in every particular to the
earth; its convex figure, its natural darkness when not illuminated, its density, its distinction into solid and liquid, the
1 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, p. 150.
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variation of its phases • • • • 112

What are the analogues that we

can compare with the universe Philo asked Cleanthes.

Without

giving Cleanthes time to answer Philo answered his own question-there aren't any!

The world is a particular, not a member of a

species a great number of whose members have been observed.
Therefore, Philo inferred that the world cannot be employed as
a

sub~ect

in the design argument, because there aren't any points

of comparison that could be made between the world and human contrivances (or anything else, presumably); the world is unique;
it is on the surface not a member of the class of artificial contrivances.
As we can see Hume did not elaborate on the differences
between the world and human artifacts.
the impossibility of the task.

Instead, he maintained

The universe being unique, Hume

implies, negates the possibility of it being compared with anything else.
Although Hume does not answer the first critical question
necessary to support his evaluation of the design argument, does
the fact that the universe or world is unique or single affect
the argument?

The design argument would seem to be affected by

the world being unique only if there was no reference class or
property to which both the universe and other things could refer
to.

As Alvin Plantinga states the problem:
How does the fact that the universe is single affect the
argument? It would seem to be relevant only if it implies
that there are no classes of which the universe is a
2 Ibid.' p. 151.

member (or perhaps no classes which contain it and other
things), and hence no reference class for the argument •• • •
Th.ere are reference classes or properties to which the universe
and other things can refer to, Plantinga continues, and rightly
concludes on this basis, that Hume's objection to the uniqueness
of the universe does not invalidate the argument:
But, of course, there are any number of classes to which
both the universe and many other things belong: the
class of very large things, for example, or things more
than fifty years old. The mere fact that a thing is
unique does not of course entail that it has no property
in common with anything else.'
The fact that the universe is single or unique,
therefore, does not invalidate the argument.4

Hence Hume's contention that anything unique precludes the
possibility of it being compared with anything else is categorically wrong.

As R. G. Swinburne states: "Nothing describable is

unique under all descriptions (the universe is, but the solar
system, a number of material bodies distributed in empty space)
and everything describable is unique under some desoription."5
After all Cleanthes has established the similarity between the
universe and things we know to be designed on the basis of an
adaptation of means to ends.
Furthermore it might also be noted that Hume's gecond objection suggests that we are not allowed to draw conclusions about
objects which are the only one of its kind.

If this iP the case,

R. G. Swinburne maintains, ' we would have to discredit the results
of cosmologists who are reaching scientific conclusions about the
3Alvin Plantinga. God and Other Minds• P• 101.
4 Ibid.

5R. G.

Swinburne, "The Argument from Design," 208.
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universe as a whole, because it is the only one ot its kind.

We

would also have to discredit the arguments by physical anthropologists about the origin of our human race, because there is not
supposedly other human races at this time to make comparisons
with.

As he states the objection:
The other objection which seems to be invalid in
the above passage is that we cannot reach conclusions
about an object which is the only one ot its kind, and,
as the Universe is such an object, we cannot reach conclusions about the regularities characteristic of it
as a whole. But, cosmologists are reaching very-well
tested scientific conclusions about the Universe as a
whole, as are physical anthropologists about the origins ot our human race, even though it is the only
human race of which we haye knowledge and perhaps the
only human race there is.6
Since Hume was not able to support his evaluation of the

design argument by either employing the first criterion tor
evaluating analogical arguments or by establishing that the
universe could not be used as a subject for a sound analogical
argument, let us see if he employed the second criterion tor
evaluating analogical arguments.

The second criterion that

Hume could have employed to support his evaluation ot the design
argument was to determine that the number of observable instances
established between the property of design in productions of
human contrivances and the universe were not sutticient to support the inference stated in the argument.
Hume took a "crack" at, this problem with his first objections, while he circumnavigated the problem in his second objection.

Philo had argued in his first objection to the design

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LISRAR'f
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argument that the design attributed to the world as a whole
cannot be used as an instance by Cleanthes to establish the similarity between the universe and things we know to be designed.
This was thought to be evident according to Philo because the
teleological order of the universe as a whole would have to be
inferred from particular cases of design exhibited in the world,
and this would mean that we would be arguing from parts to whole
which cannot be done according to him.
There are two points to be discerned in Hume's first objection.

First Cleanthes had not only postulated the design of the

universe as a whole, but he had also referred to the instances
of the "curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature."
Secondly, Philo's objection rests on his assumption, as Plantinga states, "that no whole can resemble its parts (or some set
of its parts) sufficiently to support an analogical inference."?
In regard to the first point, even if we were not able to
establish that the design of the universe as a whole was not a
relevant instance of design to establish in the argument from
design, we would still have the individual instances of design
in the world to possibly support the conclusion in the design
argument.

F. R. Tennant, arguing this point, asserts that the

inference in the argument from design would not be limited due
to our lack of knowledge of the world as a whole.

'

As he states:

The knowable world, however, is not identical with
the universe as to which, as a whole, we have no knowledge. It may be objected, therefore, that to use the
phrase "the world'' to denote both of these seems to be
?Plantinga, God and Other Minds, p. 98.
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a vital question. Of course, if trustworthy evidence
of design in the limited portion of the universe that we
know were forthcoming, a world-designer would be "provedA"
and our ignorance as to other parts would be irrelevant.o
In regard to the second part mentioned above about Hume's
assumption that no whole can resemble its parts, or some set of
its parts sufficiently to support an analogical inference, we
have only to examine an argument of this type to determine the
general validity of this assumption.

As Plantinga argues if

we were to infer that the North Cascades Wilderness Area itself
probably contains seven or more Douglas firs to the acre based
on our knowledge that large parts of the North Cascades Wilderness Area contain more than seven Douglas firs to the acre we
would be arguing from parts to whole, and be justified.

Hence

Hume's assertion, Plantinga continues, that we are not justified
in arguing from parts to whole is false.

What we would have to

consider he maintains in each case is the specific whole at
parts in question.

As Plantinga states the objection:

Philo, • • .apparently suggests that no whole can resemble its parts {or some set of its parts) sufficiently to
support an analogical inference. But surely this is not
so. I know large parts of the North Oasoade Wilderness
area contain more than seven Douglas firs to the acre
(and have no contrary evidence); I can reasonably conclude that the North Cascades Wilderness Area itself probably contains seven or more Douglas firs to the acre.
On just the information cited, my conclusion certainly
seems to be more probable than not. The general conclusion that one cannot properly argue from parts to whole
is false. Everything depends upon the specific whole
and parts in question:9
8 F. R. Tennant, "Cosmic Teleology," in Classical and Contempora91 Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. by John HlcK,
P• 2 •
9Plantinga, God and Other Minds, p. 98.
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Hence since Hume did not accept the conclusion that we can
argue from parts to whole depending upon the specific whole and
parts in question, he did not bother to investigate the ways that
we could possibly argue in the case from the observable instances
of design in the world to the design of the universe or world as
a whole.

Therefore he cannot conclude to the impossibility or

the same, which means that his objection to the design or the universe as a whole, being an instance in which we could compare
with human contrivances, is inconclusive.
While Hume pointed his first objection in the direction of
evaluating the instances that have been said to be established
between the design in the universe and things we know to be
designed, he sailed around the problem with his third objection.
Instead of indicating the lack or sufficient instances in which
the design in the world could be compared with artificial products of contrivances to sufficiently support the conclusion in
the argument from design, Hume maintained in his third objection
that there were not enough observable instances ot the origin of
worlds.

This point was brought out when Philo argued that the

design argument was not scientific in that it ottered no evidence
tor the cause of the world order.

In order to draw an inference

ot a cause tor any effect it is necessary, Philo insisted, to
have observed the cause an<\ effect in conjunction--and no one
has seen the origin or one world, let alone "worlds."

Therefore

Philo concluded ! priori, since no ! posteriori evidence is
available concerning the cause of the world, it may have caused
itself.

The doctrine of evolution provided precisely the filling
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for this cavity, arguing that natural selection provides a "law"
which explains how the world and the organisms in it took on
their torm.
Although Hume did not answer the question whether there was
not an adequate number of instances in which the design in the
world could be compared with human contrivances; let's see whether Hume's third objection invalidates the stated argument from
design.

Briefly Hume has argued that one can only inter trom

an observed A to an unobserved B when we have frequently obs•rved
A's and B's together.

Hence we cannot inter trom the adaptation

of means to ends in the universe to an unobserved intelligent
designer on the analogy of the connection between observed cases
of design in human artifacts and human agents, unless we have
observed at other times other designers in the process of creating or designing other worlds.
"This argument, • • • " Swinburne points out, ''reveals Hume's
inadequate appreciation of scientific method."lO

Scientists

have been making conclusions about the origin ot the universe
even if they haven't experienced the origin.

They have also been

arguing to the existence ot many other unobservable things which
have not been previously experienced, based on the similarity of
the analogues in question.
inference to the rotation
or argumentation.

Even Philo's example of Galileo's

pf the earth is an example of this type

No one had actually seen the rotation of the

earth when the inference was made.

As Swinburne states: "As we

saw in the scientific examples which I cited a more developed
10swinburne, "The Argument from Design," 208.
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science than Hume knew has taught us that when observed A's have
a relation R to observed B's, it is often perfectly reasonable
to postulate that observed A*'s, similar to A's have the same
relation to unobserved and unobservable B*'s similar to B's."11

Mr. Plantinga in basic agreement contends that Hume's " • • •
suggestion is too strong; it implies that we could make no sound
inductive inference concerning the origin, tor example, of the
largest crow in the Amazon jungle, since we obviously cannot
have had experience of various largest crows in the Amazon. 012
Since Hume's contention that we can only infer from an observed effect to an unobserved cause when we have frequently
observed identical eff eots and causes together is a misnomer in
the logic of scientific reasoning, and at the same time in the
logic of analogical reasoning in general, his second objection
does not seem to invalidate the argument from design.
point can be made at this time.

A further

Since Hume's third objection

lacks the support to vitiate the design argument, Hume was not
able to substantiate his claim that there was no

~

Rosteriori

evidence available concerning the cause of the world.
conclusion that "• •• aught we can

know~

Hence his

priori, matter may

contain the source or spring or order originally, within itself,
• • • 111 3 fails to have any impact.

Before moving on to

t~e

last area of this thesis, let's

11 Ibid.

-

12Plantinga, God and other Minds, P• 99.
l3Hume, DialoS'!es Concerning Natural Religion, p. 146.
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briefly speculate on Hume's hypothesis or a self-caused world
which Darwin picked up and was thought to have made a convinoing
case tor.

Besides the notion that "The survival of the fittest
presupposes the arrival or the fit, • • • "14 there are other considerations that make Darwin's theory less obvious than it seems.
Richard Taylor points out that a consideration or any living
thing whatever indicates that its power and construction are
perfectly adapted to its mode of life.

As he states:

A hawk, for example, has sharp talons, rapacious beak,
keen eyes, strength, and a digestive system all perfectly
suited to a predatory mode of life. A lowly spider has
likewise precisely what is needed in order to entrap its
pray in artfully contrived snares. So it is with every
creature whatever. • • •
Now, as Darwin suggests, Taylor concludes:
One can, of course, insist that it is only because such
beings are so equipped that they pursue the goals that
they do, and deny that they are so equipped in order to
pursue those goals, just as one can insist that it is
only because a man is carrying rod and reel that he goes
fishing, and deny that he is carrying the equipment in
order 1D tish; but this seems artifical even it one
gives the evolutionary theory of Qrigin of such creatures everything that it claims.15
Now that our detour has led us back to the main highway of
this work, let's see if Hume has followed the last road sign
needed to terminate his trip.

As we have observed Hume did not

as yet follow the directions needed to reach his goal, nor was
he able t.o reach it by his own private roads.
out 0£ the three criteria necessary for evaluating the
design argument, the last criterion, as stated earlier, is the
14Tennant, "Cosmic Teleology," P• 295.
1 5R1chard Taylor, Metaphysics, p. 95.
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most difficult to employ.

Even after being satisfied that we

had established the sufficient similarity between the universe
and things we know to be designed, on the basis of an adaptation of means to ends exhibited in both analogues, and the sufficient number of instances in which this characteristic had been
observed between the analogues to support the conclusion of the
argument from design, we still would have the problem of relevancy
to contend with.

We would have to explain in what relevant ways

the property of design was said to support the conclusions of our
argument.
In the case of Hume's evaluation he would have had to explain
how the property of design was not relevant to support the conclusion in the argument from design.

If he would have given the

answer to this problem he could have supported his evaluation
(and thus reached his goal) but we can see that in order to have
furnished an answer he would have bad to indicate the differences
between the universe and things we know to be designed.

This was

important, as was revealed earlier, because in order to determine
that the design or "curious adapting of means to ends" was not a
relevant characteristic to support the inference in the argument
from design, one would have to explain how the differences between
the analogues were sufficient to vitiate the argument.
Since we have exhaustei Hume's objections to Cleanthes' argument in Part II of the Dialogues, and have discovered that Hume
did not point out the differences between the universe and things
we know to be designed, we can state categorically, as Plantinga
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confirms, that "Hume has given us no answer to the question." 16
Further, we can also conclude that Hume has not given us any
answers in Part II of the Dialogues that are sufficient to support his evaluation of Cleanthes' argument trom design as not
being a sound analogical argument.

16Plantinga, God and Other Minds, P• 106.
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